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greater detail, however, before returning to ontology and the issue
of constructivism.
THE METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
ACCORDING TO MAX WEBER
Dilthey was primarily a philosopher, and his work on the
methodology of the human sciences remained highly programmatic, a
prolegomenon to any future science of man, as it were. To see these
ideas turned into concrete methodological recommendations, and
indeed to see actual scientific research undertaken under their aegis,
we have to turn to Max Weber.
A classic, immensely influential statement of the meaningfulness
of human action and its methodological implications is to be found
in Weber s main work, The Theory of Social and Economic
Organization (Weber 1947). Following Dilthey, Weber points out
that we may distinguish, within the overall phenomenon of human
conduct, between purely outward behaviour (Verhalten) bodily
movement and its inside in the form of subjective meaning
(Sinn). If, to take Weber s oft-repeated example, we observe
somebody swinging an axe at some logs (and, strictly speaking, we
should be even more behaviouristic in our description of what is
happening, since even this pared-down description presupposes
certain inner occurrences), we do not yet know what action is
being performed, until we penetrate to the subjective intentions of
the agent. Is his intention to produce firewood, so that his behaviour
counts as the action of chopping firewood? Or is it to earn a wage,
making his action that of working for a livelihood? Or is the man
just working off a fit of anger? Only a grasp of the agent s
subjective meaning will decide the issue.
The contribution of the internal aspect is marked by variations in
degree of clarity and explicitness. In the paradigm case of human
action, a clear and determinate meaning is associated with the
behaviour. But, according to Weber, this exemplary case shades
imperceptibly into less distinct forms. Thus, traditional conduct
represents a less central case of action since the meaningful aspect
is less prominent. A person who acts traditionally may not, on
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The Narrow Arguments
being asked, be able to cite any clearly defined meaning in his
action, or, at least, not any individual purpose. He will simply say
that he did what we have always done , or what one is supposed to
do . Traditional action is semi-automatic, hence less fully a human
action. Other cases that are far removed from the paradigm are those
of reactive behaviour, such as the behaviour displayed in a fit of
rage. Diametrically opposed to the paradigm case is pure reflex
behaviour, as in a man abruptly withdrawing his hand from a hot
stove.
Weber is none too clear as to the nature of the meanings that he
imputes to action. As the examples illustrate, however, he uses the
term in a broad sense to include both what we would call purely
cognitive and purely conative elements (wishes and desires, but also
emotions). Weber s presentation is obfuscated by his tendency to
characterise the various kinds of meanings in terms of the types of
understanding to which they are related. Weber distinguishes
between a rational kind of understanding and that possessed of an
emotionally empathic or artistically appreciative quality . Thus, we
have a rational understanding of the purely intellectual content of
somebody s utterance, or the content of the accompanying thought,
when (for instance) we hear a person uttering the sentence, 22=4 .
Likewise, we have a rational understanding of somebody s motives,
in the sense that we intellectually identify the values and goals
underlying his conduct. On the other hand, the empathic or
appreciative type of understanding is involved when we try to
understand the emotional context in which an action was performed.
Weber describes it as consisting of some sort of sympathetic
participation in the emotional life of the other person. It is a matter
of re-creating in one s own mind what goes on in the other person s
mind; to savour the flavour of his emotional life, as it were. And,
although he states explicitly that one need not have been Caesar in
order to understand Caesar (Weber 1947:90), he still seems to hold
that such participation represents the highest level of
understanding.
The distinction between rational and empathic understanding
intersects with that obtaining between observational and explanatory
understanding. After we have identified a person s thoughts or
motives correctly, thus attaining observational understanding, there
remains the further task of explaining why the person would think
like this or act from those motives. Weber seems to construe the
difference between the two kinds of understanding as one of
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The Phenomenological Argument
scope in seeking explanatory understanding, we place an action
already correctly identified at the observational level in a larger
context of meaning. The item is explained by the way it fits into this
broader context.
In the case of social action, this subjective meaning takes
cognisance of the action of others; this is precisely what makes the
action social. Weber s famous definition of social action states that
action is social in so far as, by virtue of the subjective meaning
attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account
of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course
(Weber 1947:88). Hence, to the extent that social action is precisely
that with which social science is concerned, social science must
determine the subjective side of human action.
In the light of this duality of action, Weber called for a duality in
the methods used in social science. Social explanation must strive
for adequacy both at the causal and the meaningful level.
Adequacy at the meaningful level implies that the connection
between the action and the motives imputed to the agent must be
understandable, either in terms of rational understanding or in terms
of understanding of the empathic, appreciative kind. Adequacy at
the causal level requires the demonstration that the postulated
motivational states were actually present and did indeed originate
the action. The mere meaningfulness of the connection does not
guarantee this. Such a guarantee can only be provided on the basis
of experiment or, failing that, an investigation of comparable
situations in which the alleged motivational factors are present and
the same action, therefore, should occur.
The showpiece of this methodological conception at work is
Weber s famous study of the origins of capitalism in The
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber 1930). Here,
Weber tries to show us the meaningful inside of a particular
historical phenomenon, the birth of capitalism the thoughts and
concerns propelling forward those who first engaged in the kind of
accumulation of wealth characteristic of capitalism. Weber
conceives more narrowly than others the connection between
protestantism and economical activity which had been noted and
commented upon by earlier social scientists, construing it as a
connection between Calvinism and industry. According to
Calvinism, strict determinism rules in the world of human action;
God has preordained everything in human affairs, including the
question of who will be saved and who will be damned. But,
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The Narrow Arguments
Weber claims, this state of affairs is intolerable to man, rendering
him helpless with respect to the most important issue he is ever to
face. Thus, in order to provide deliverance from this plight, a
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